Subedar Netrabahadur Thapa VC

                                                  Subedar Netrabahadur Thapa VC

Acting Subedar Netrabahadur Thapa, was born on 8 th January 1916 in the village called Rahu in Nepal.

Netrabahadur Thapa was an acting Subedar with 2/5 Gurkha Rifles during Battle of Imphal. The battalion was commanded by Lieutenant Colonel John Eustace during the June of 1944. On 25/26 June 1944 at Mortar Bluff,  a feature very close to the old Silchar track or Tongei Maril, Bishenpur, Subadar Netrabahadur Thapa was in command of a small isolated hill post, when the Japanese attacked in force. The men, inspired by their leader's fine example, held their ground and the Japanese were beaten off, but casualties were very heavy and reinforcements were requested. When these arrived some hours later they too became casualties, but the subedar, undeterred, retrieved the ammunition himself and took the offensive with grenades and kukris, until he was killed. For this valour action Netrabahadur Thapa was awarded the highest Military award of British and Commonwealth force, the Victoria Cross. Five VC’s were awarded in battles of 2^nd World War in Manipur.

“At half past six on June 25^th forty-one Gurkhas under Subadar Netrabahadur Thapa were sent off up the steep hillside with signalers and with soldiers and mules carrying food and ammunitions, to take over the isolated post of Mortar Bluff, a small round pimple rising out of open grassland and barely large enough to contain a platoon”. (Imphal, 1962)

The War Diary of 2/5 Gurkha Rifles recorded the following incident:

“25th June 1944(Sunday):- Order Received for Bn. to march from Bishenpur at 1000 hrs for EVANS KNOB ( hills overlooking Silchar Track). Arrived there 1600 hrs and occupied Northants’ old positions. D Coy, less 1 Pl. and 2 x 3” Mortars moved forward to B.P. Piquet. 1 Pl. D Coy( Sub. Netrabahadur Thapa) plus two secs of C Coy moved forward to MORTAR BLUFF Piquet. Enemy started attacking M.B. at 2000 hrs practically all ammunition and grenades expended. The enemy, estimated one Coy were attacking from all directions, and many enemy had succeeded in getting inside the wire. 2 Secs of B Coy were send up with ammunitions at 2230 hrs. All communication broken. Heavy rain all night.

26^th June 1944 (Monday):- At 0415 hrs. information received that MORTAR BLUFF had been overrun and occupied by the enemy.  A, C and Bn. HQ plus 2 x 3” Mortars moved out at 0530 hrs and arrived at B.P. Piquet at 0740 hrs, and were there shelled by 75mm. Major McGill severely wounded on head and later died. 3 Havs also killed, 2 wounded and 1 Sub wounded all by one shell. Several man and mules also killed and wounded”.

His Citation reads:

        Subadar Netrabahadur Thapa was in command of the garrison of 41 men of the 2/5th Royal Gurkha Rifles (Frontier Force) which on the afternoon of 25th June, 1944, took over the isolated piquet known as Mortar Bluff situated on the hillside commanding the base at Bishenpur in Burma( wrongly written, it should be Manipur). The piquet position, completely devoid of any cover, was situated some 400 yards from the next piquet, from which it could be supported to some extent by 3 inch mortar fire, but was commanded by Water Piquet, a short distance away on high ground to the South, which had been over-run by strong enemy forces on the previous night and was still in enemy hands. Owing to its commanding position the retention of Mortar Bluff was vital to the safety of other positions farther down the ridge and to Bishenpur itself.
        The relief had been harassed by enemy snipers at close range but was completed at 1830 hours without casualties. A little more than an hour later the enemy began to attack. For this purpose a 75 millimeter and a 37 millimeter gun were brought on up to the high ground overlooking the position and poured shell after shell at point blank range for ten minutes into the narrow confines of the piquet, and this was followed by a determined attack by not less than one company of Japanese. A fierce fight ensued in which Subadar Netrabahadur Thapa's men, exhorted by their leader, held their ground against heavy odds and drove the enemy back with disproportionate losses. During this time Subadar Netrabahadur Thapa with tireless energy and contempt for his own safety moved from post to post encouraging his young N.C.Os and riflemen, of which the garrison was largely composed, and tending the wounded.
A short lull followed during which Subadar Netrabahadur Thapa gave a clear and concise report on the telephone to his Commanding Officer and asked for more artillery defensive fire. Having done this he made preparations to meet the next onslaught which was not long in coming.
Under cover of the pitch dark night and torrential rain the enemy had moved round to the jungle from the cover of which they launched their next attack. Still in considerable strength and as determined and ferocious as ever the enemy poured out from the jungle across the short space of open ground to the piquet defences under cover of small arms and 37 millimetre gun fire from a flank. For a time our men held their ground until, as ill-luck would have it, both the L.M.G. and T.M.G. of one section jammed.
With much reduced fire-power the section were unable to hold on, and the enemy forced an entrance and over-ran this and another section, killing or wounding 12 out of the 16 men comprising the two sections. Having no reserve Subadar Netrabahadur Thapa himself went forward from his Headquarters and stemmed any further advance with grenades.
The situation was however critical. With more than half his men casualties, ammunition low, and the enemy in possession of part of his perimeter, Subadar Netrabahadur Thapa would have been justified in withdrawing, but in his next report to his Commanding Officer he stated that he intended holding on and asked for reinforcements and more ammunition.
So efficient were his plans for defence and such was the fine example of this gallant Gurkha officer that not a man moved from his trench and not a yard more ground was gained by the enemy, despite their desperate attempts.
Thus the night passed until at 0400 hours a section of 8 men with grenades and small arms ammunition arrived. Their arrival inevitably drew fire and all the 8 were soon casualties. Undismayed, however, Subadar Netrabahadur Thapa retrieved the ammunition and himself with his platoon Headquarters took the offensive armed with grenades and khukris. Whilst so doing he received a bullet wound in the mouth followed shortly afterwards by a grenade which killed him outright. His body was found next day, khukri in hand and dead Japanese with a cleft skull by his side.
True to the traditions of the service and his race Subadar Netrabahadur Thapa had fought against overwhelming odds for 8 hours before he was killed. His fine example of personal bravery and his high sense of duty so inspired his men that a vital position was held to the limit of human endurance.
His valour and devotion to duty will remain an epic in the history of the Regiment.[London Gazette issue 36742 dated 12 Oct 1944, published 10 Oct 1944.]

                                                               THE GOLD RUSH

 

 

The Tree

   Hevea brasiliensis, also known as the Para rubber tree after the Brazilian port of Para, is a quick growing, fairly sturdy, perennial tree of a height of 25 to 30 metres. It has a straight trunk and thick, somewhat soft, light brownish grey bark. The young plant shows characteristic growth pattern of alternating period of rapid elongation and consolidated development. The leaves are trifoliate with long stalks. The tree is deciduous in winters from December to February in India. Refoliation is quick and copious flowering follows. Flowers are small but appearing in large clusters. Fruits are three lobed, each holding three seeds, quite like castor seeds in appearance but much larger in size. The seeds are oil bearing.Rubber latex is extracted from rubber trees. The economic life period of rubber trees in plantations is around 32 years – up to 7 years of immature phase and about 25 years of productive phase.

 

The Requirements

The soil requirement of the plant is generally well-drained, weathered soil consisting of laterite, lateritic types, sedimentary types, nonlateritic red, or alluvial soils.

The climatic conditions for optimum growth of rubber trees are:

• Rainfall of around 250 cm evenly distributed without any marked dry season and with at least 100 rainy days per year
• Temperature range of about 20 to 34°C, with a monthly mean of 25 to 28°C
• High atmospheric humidity of around 80%
• Bright sunshine amounting to about 2000 hours per year at the rate of six hours per day throughout the year. 

   The NE Scenerio.

                     The favourable climatic conditions found in the Northeast are suitable for the flourishing growth of rubber trees and nearly 4,50,000 hectares of the region’s arable lands has already been marked for rubber farming. The commercial rubber plantation in the Northeast was introduced during the British colonial rule.

                  Farmers in the regions are now fast realizing the economical viability of rubber cultivation and they have started growing these valuable cash crops on large scales. A perfect example could be seen at Dhoopcherra village in Tripura, where the Jhumia tribals are practicing rubber cultivation. In other states like Assam, farmers of Karbi Anglong and Gopalpara districts are enthusiastically taking up rubber cultivation on a big scale. A figure in 2007 shows over 2,900 hectares of land in Gopalpara are under Rubber cultivation and it provides a source of livelihood to nearly 7,000 families. In 2007-08 Tripura had 41,165 hectares of land under rubber cultivation; Assam had 18,225, Meghalaya 6,838, Nagaland 2,697, Manipur 1,914, Mizoram 551 and Arunachal 458 hectares.

               Rubber cultivation is a labour-intensive practice and thus generates rural employment. The Ministry of Commerce and Industry’s Rubber Board has implemented various projects such as the ‘Accelerated Development of Rubber Plantation’ and ‘Rubber Development’ in the North East. Awareness camps and training programmes are being held for farmers. Besides, subsidies and work, land is also provided to them. Local rubber farmers in Gopalpara district are already benefiting from the venture.

 

The Manipur Scenerio

      Plantation of rubber having found suitable in South-Western part of Manipur, there is quite a good scope for cultivation of rubber in Jiribam area. In general, rubber trees can be put under tapping after 7 years of plantation and the financial returns would outpace the investment once tapping/production of raw rubber commences.

Rubber Plantation in Jiribam is presently giving satisfaction to the following objectives:

1. To generate employment
2. To put abandoned jhum/degraded land under productive use.
3. To demonstrate a viable alternative to shifting cultivation.
4. To open avenue for new rubber based industrial ventures and,
5. To earn revenue

 In the last 3-4 years many businessmen, professionals and people from other professions have started Rubber plantation in Jiribam. Not only people from Manipur but people from Barak valley, Gauhati etc have started investing on Rubber in Jiribam. Small Hotels have mushroomed facilitating planters from various part of North East in their visits.

My  Story.

 

 

In June 2010, I started planting 800 rubber plants in 2 hectares of land at Jiribam in association with one of my friends. Barbed Wire fencing was done in the boundary of the farm. The Rubber board reimburses expenditure on my barbed wiring expenses the following year. During December in 2012, the trees have grown more than 10 feet with small stem, so bamboo support was given to save the plant from strong winds. Grass cutting was done two times in a year. In 2013, the rubber plants have reached an average height of 18 feet. The stems have not grown bigger so that year again Bamboo support was given to protect from the strong wind.  During the end of 2014, I went to check the trees which have grown more than 25 feet. The trees have spread their branches and have grown drastically. The fencing posts were changed with new ones. The trees were painted with lime upon 5 feet. I notice two trees destroyed by strong wind and few more destroyed my termites. This June I shall be giving my trees with fertilizers and will plant more in the available space. After 3 years I am sure my trees will give a return of Rs 3/ per day  for 10 months in a year.

The first battle of WW2 in Indian Soil

THE FIRST BATTLE OF 2^ND WORLD WAR IN INDIA

 

The First Battle on Indian Soil.

           The Japanese occupation of the Andaman Islands occurred in 1942 during World War II. The only military objective on the islands was the city of Port Blair. The garrison consisted of a 300 man Sikh militia with 23 British officers, augmented in January 1942 by a Gurkha detachment of 4/12th Frontier Force Regiment of the 16th Indian Infantry Brigade. Following the fall of Rangoon on March 8,  the British realize that Port Blair had become impossible to defend, and on March 10 the Gurkhas were withdrawn to the Arakan peninsula.

         Port Blair was occupied by Japanese on the 23^rd March 1942. The garrison offered no resistance to the landings, and were disarmed and interned; many of the Sikh militia later enlisted in the Indian National Army.  The British militia officers were sent to Singapore as POWs, whilst Chief Commissioner Waterfall, Deputy Commissioner Major A.G. Bird and the other British administrative officers were imprisoned.

    When Japanese three divisions cross Chindwin river and attack Imphal and Kohima ( operation U-Go), the first engagement in Indian soil with the Japanese  tidal wave was encountered by 152 Para Battalion ,C company under Major J Fuller at Point 7378, Ukhrul, Manipur on 19^th March 1944.  152 Indian Para Battalion was Under Brigadier Hope Thomson’s 50^th Para Brigade.

 

Prelude :-

     The task given to 31^st Japanese Division was to capture Kohima. To do this, Lieutenant –General Sato had planned to cross the Chindwin in three main columns, of which the right and centre columns were to move directly on Kohima from the north of Homalin. The left column, behind which Gen. Sato and his headquarter moved, was to cross the river at Homalin and at two places a few miles south of it, capture Ukhrul and then advance north-west on to the Imphal-Kohima Road so as to destroy the British as they withdrew from Imphal. At the same time they were to give every assistance to the other two columns in capturing Kohima.

     50 Brigade had only arrived at Kohima from North-West India at the end of February 1944 in order to gain experience of jungle warfare.  The Brigade , which was commanded by Brigadier M. Hope Thompson, a thirty six year old British Service Officer who had raised and trained it was made up of 152 and 153 Para battalions, a medium machine gun company, a squadron of sappers and a field ambulance.

  When 152 Para battalion reaches Sangshak, 153 battalion was still in Kohima. 

 

50^th Indian Para Brigade and its Disposition around  Point 7378:-

            50^th  Indian Parachute Brigade was formed in 1942. Its three parachute battalions were formed from volunteers from throughout the Indian Army as well as the British Army in India.  The 151^st parachute Battalion was formed from British volunteers, the 152^nd Battalion was formed from Indians and the 153^rd was formed from Gurkhas . However 151^st battalion soon found itself shipped off to the 1^st Airborne Division in the Mediterranean and got itself renamed 156^th battalion.  To replace the 151^st battalion , now in middle east, came another Gurkha Unit: the 3^rd Battalion of the 7^th regiment, Gurkha Rifles. A wartime formation, it had taken part in the retreat from Burma in 1942 as part of the 17^th Division in Slim’s Burma corps, where it had suffered serious casualties, not least from sickness. Recuperating at Amritsar with a solid nucleus of battle-hardened officers and men, the battalion had volunteered en bloc to join the 50^th Parachute Brigade. They had arrived at Campbellpore early in 1943, to be renamed the 154^th Battalion . At the time of their arrival they numbered only about 300, which meant a great deal of recruitment still lay ahead of them. Their CO, John Stevens, who had raised and commanded them in Burma, was found unfit for parachuting; his replacement broke a leg while jumping, and it was not until Lieutenant-Colonel G.O(Joe) White assumed command some months later that the battalion really got into its stride.

                In mid March 1944, the 50^th Para Brigade under Brigadier M. Hope Thompson arrived at Ukhrul to relieve the 49^th Indian Brigade. The newly arrived Paras take over range of scattered hilltop positions once occupied by the 49^th Brigade. Lt Col Paul Hopkinson’s 152 (Indian) Para Battalion moved up to the position called Kidney Camp. From Kidney Camp, on 18^th March he send two companies out to occupy hill top positions and relieve 4/5 Mahratta Light Infantry. 4/5 Mahratta Light Infantry went as reserved at Kidney Camp. Major Webb’s B Company was dispatched to Point 7386 ( Badger) and Point 7000  ( Gamnom). While Major J Fuller’s A company was sent to the militarily un-named Point 7378.   All these positions dominated the two east west jeep tracks over the hills in the area. The first two days were spend improving their trenches, dugouts and firing positions.

 

The Japanese Entered India:-

                   Lieutenant Susumu Nishida, the intelligence officer of the 58^th regiment had made the first reconnaissance of the jungle path in 1943 with a small patrol. His meticulous work made possible the subsequent swift advance of Sato’s 31^st Division towards Kohima. In March 1944, the Japanese army were waiting for several days at their staging point about four kilometers from the Chindwin. At 21.15 of 15^th March( X Day) an orderly rushed in with instructions to get ready to move. All along the river bank, through the regiments of General Sato’s 31^st Division, there was a stirring of men and animals. Lieutenant General Renya Mutaguchi had told them that the operation might even lead to the conclusion of the war, “this operation will engage the attention of the whole world and is eagerly awaited by a hundred million of our countrymen. Its success will have a profound effect on the course of the war, and may even lead to its conclusion. We must therefore expend every ounce of energy and talent to achieve our purpose”. From their staging point an arc around the town of Homalin, the soldiers of General Sato’s three infantry regiments, his mountain artillery and support units were converging on their designating crossing points.

                 There were three Japanese columns advancing on Kohima via different routes. General Sato sends Miyazaki off with the main infantry group in the direction of the village of Ukhrul, where he would capture stores and then move to block the road at Kohima. Another battalion of 58^th Regiment was sent through the wilds of the Somra tract to the north, while General Sato’s own column would travel the central route via Kharasom.

             On the afternoon of 18^th March, Naga villagers came into Sangshak from the Village of Pushing, about a dozen or more miles east. The Japanese had occupied their village and were moving west.

             On 19^th March morning, Lt Col Hopkinson, personally climb up Badger  to spot  long column of men, a full battalion, complete with pack horses and even elephants, advancing up the Homalin road. Point 7378 lay directly in their path and Hopkinson immediately radioed a warning to Major Fuller, whose C Company was clearly going to fight the 50 Brigades first battle. The Japanese battalion that had been spotted was the 3^rd Battalion of the 58^th regiment.

 

Point 7378 and its strategic importance:- 

             Point 7378, which stands at 7378 feet above sea level is locally called Harvakhangai.  Harvakhangai is a pimple on the spur of Shiroi hill (point 8425). Harvakhangai  is covered with grass and hardly any big tree grows on its peak. Point 7378 lie 2 Km east of Kangkhui Village. The Battle hill is 11.5 km as the crow flies in the north east direction from Sangshak village.  The Ukhrul -Pushing jeep track passes at its southern and eastern portion. Its significance lay in the fact that it overlooked the Jeep Track between the village of Pushing and Ukhrul, at a point where it joined the slightly wider but still winding rollercoaster track north to Kohima and south to Imphal. When Major Fuller’s Company reach the hill, it was half dug for defence by the Marathas.  It blocked Miyazaki’s advance and therefore had to be captured.  From Homalin the Japanese column of 31^st division passes through the village of Pushing and they have to attack Kohima after crossing Ukhrul. Point 7378 lie in between Pushing and Ukhrul.

 

The Battle Begins:-

          Major John Fuller’s small company at point 7378 consist of a section of three-inch mortars from the support company and a pair of medium machine guns from the Brigade’s machine gun company but no artillery was far enough forward to give them support; in total they numbered about 170, including seven British Ofiicers. Major Fullers order had been to hold the hill until relieved to be on his guard against small Japanese petrols that might percolate from Burma and meanwhile to continue improvement of the defences. As a matter of prudence Fuller had positioned a three man observation post about a mile ahead of Point 7378, on the track to Pushing.

             At 9 O clocks in the morning of 19^th March 1944, Major Fuller heard from his observation team that the enemy had been sighted. Within half an hour 900 Japanese had been counted, moving fast along the track towards Point 7378.

            By 1400 hour the company was completely surrounded, but beat off frequent attacks which continued all day and throughout the night. Suddenly, during the following morning, the Japanese attackers noticed the defenders fire had ceased- they had run out of ammunition.

   Lieutenant Hirayama on the night of 19^th was given order to mount flanking movement to the left of the British trenches. Once in position he settled down and waited for further order. Lt Hirayama and the rest of the 3^rd battalion, 58^th regiment had bumped up against Major Fuller’s C Company. The first Japanese assault was beaten off. But throughout the night there were two subsequent attacks which gained ground. There were about 170 defenders.

    On the evening of the 19^th, soon after Point 7378 came under attack, Hopkinson dispatch the 152^nd’s A Company under Richard Gillett , on a flanking route intended to bring them on to Point 7378 from the east. Due to the Jungle and difficulty of moving and identifying location at night they eventually reach a point about half a mile east of point 7378 and the battle was at that time at its last stage.

  On the other hand Trim had sent Holland and the Maratha’s A company along the track from Sheldons corner, directly towards Point 7378, only to find that the Japanese had anticipated the move. They had placed a roadblock at the point where the track debounched onto the pushing- Ukhrul road. Holland was forced to call off the counter attack with six men killed and eighteen wounded.

       At the dawn of 20^th Hopkinson heard for the last time from point 7378 from Lieutenant Easton. Major Fuller with three other officers and forty men were killed.  Roseby the second –in –command had been seriously wounded and the shortage of ammunition was desperate. Lt.  Easton also reported that he was gradually being overrun and was withdrawing on Sheldon’s corner. Only twenty men got away to rejoin some weeks later.

C company was completely eliminated, but the Japanese suffered 160 casualties including seven officers. By midday on 20 March the engagement was over, a  tragic sacrifice of a fine fighting unit because of incompetence in providing supplies, barbed wire, ammunitions and above all, up-to-date Intelligence.

       The official history of the Japanese 58^th regiment described the closing stage of the fight.  A party of about twenty British and Indians charged downhill, firing and shouting as they came. But between them and the Japanese was a wide ravine, into which some of the men fell. Most of the others were forced to surrender, while a few escaped. The Japanese then witness an extraordinary scene. ‘At the very top of the position an officer appeared in sight, put a pistol to his head and shoot himself in full view of everyone below. Our men fell silent, deeply impressed by such a brave act’. The suicide of an officer in full view of the enemy was not part of any British military tradition. But it was a gesture the Japanese understood perfectly and it gave them food for thought. These were different soldiers from the ones routed in Burma and Singapore.

Aftermath:-

    The Japanese 58th regiment suffered 160 casualties in the twenty six hour battle, during which the Para had resisted with courage and skill.

  A dozen soldiers of the C Company were captured as POW by the Japanese 58^th regiment.  Another 20 soldiers survived from the battle. The rest 140 of the C Company were killed in this battle.

           The bodies of following 38 soldiers of the 152 Para Battalion, C Company were not recovered from the battlefield after the war. They have been enlisted as KIA in the battle at point 7378.

SL NO	NAME	AGE	RANK
1	BABU RAM	23	Sepoy
2	BABU SINGH	31	Rifleman
3	BANI SINGH	19	Sepoy
4	BHAGAT RAM	22	Sepoy
5	BHAGWAN SINGH	32	Jemadar
6	BHAMRI RAM	23	Sepoy
7	CHUNI SINGH	26	Sepoy
8	DALE RAM	26	Rifleman
9	DARWAN SING CHAUHAN	23	Sepoy
10	GIRDHARI LAL	31	Jemadar
11	GOVIND GURAO	33	Sepoy
12	HARI SINGH	20	Sepoy
13	JAR SINGH	27	Lance Naik
14	JOBAN	27	Lance Naik
15	JOT SING BARTWAL	21	Sepoy
16	KALYAN SINGH	24	Sepoy
17	KESHAR SING KHARKOLA	29	Sepoy
18	LAKHPAT SINGH	25	Rifleman
19	MADHO SINGH	24	Sepoy
20	MADHO SINGH	23	Naik
21	MUHAMMAD SADIQ		Barber
22	NARAYAN PARSHAD	26	Rifleman
23	NATHU SINGH	18	Naik
24	PADAM SINGH	20	Sepoy
25	PAN SINGH	23	Sepoy
26	PHUL SINGH	26	Sepoy
27	PURAN SINGH	22	Sepoy
28	RAJ MAL	23	Lance Naik
29	RATAN SINGH BISHT	23	Naik
30	RATI RAM		Sepoy
31	RUP RAM	23	Naik
32	SARDAR SINGH	19	Sepoy
33	SHEO RAM	23	Sepoy
34	SRI NATH	30	Sepoy
35	SUKH RAM	31	Sepoy
36	TATYA INGWAY	21	Sepoy
37	TEKU RAM	22	Sepoy
38	UMED SINGH	20	Sepoy

  

Following soldiers of the 4^th Battalion, 5th Maratha Light Infantry were also killed around the Jeep track at  Point 7378 when Marathas’ A company went to help Major Fullers C company  during  the battle and their bodies were never recovered.

SL NO	NAME	AGE	RANK
1	BUDHAJI MALKAR	26	Sepoy
2	DAGDU KANGANE	23	Sepoy
3	DATTARAM THAKRE	22	Sepoy
4	GOVIND SAWANT	22	Sepoy
5	JAIRAM KADAM	32	Lance Havildar
6	NAIKU NIKAM	21	Sepoy
7	RAO RANGAT	28	Sepoy
8	SADASHIV PAWAR	23	Lance Naik
9	SHANKAR KATE	26	Sepoy
10	VITHOBA JADHAO	28	Lance Naik

 

Following British Officers were killed during the Battle of point 7378.

SL  NO	NAME	SURNAME	AGE	RANK
1	FAUL	JOHN ANDREW	27	Lieutenant
2	FROST	EDWIN DOUGLAS	24	Captain
3	FULLER	JOHN ANNESLEY ODONNELL	24	Major
4	HATTON	WALLACE DAVID		Lieutenant
5	LAYTON	SIDNEY ROBERT	23	Lieutenant
6	LUSCOMBE	HARRY	25	Captain
7	ROSEBY	THOMAS HENRY MAURICE	22	Captain

 

Next day after the battle i.e on 21^st the Japanese buried the death soldiers of C Company at the side of the track.

 

Conclusion:-

       50 Brigade were not geared for action. They had for example, brought the Mess silver but had no steel helmets. They quickly established themselves in the Sangshak area , but although 152^nd battalion had drawn stores and ammunitions at Litan as they moved up to Sangshak, the brigade received no further supplies or ammunitions- and above all no further information from Corps or Divisional HQ about the Japanese advance. No operational orders at all were received until the Japanese had put in their first attack. The inertia and competence at Corps HQ in its dealing with 50 Brigade has caused deep resentment among the survivors of this hard fought battle, with even the war diaries of Corps HQ 16-20 march showing chaos and confusion, and confirming that no directions of orders were sent to 50 Brigade. This situation seems even more extraordinary as the Brigade had a land line to 23^rd Division HQ at Litan, and even after Sangshak had been cut off an effective radio link was maintained. Thus the valuable information about Japanese movements, which the V force agents had risked their lives to obtain, because of failure in Corps or Division HQ, never reached the very unit which was about to be attacked.

     For all the clarity of thought and speed of action displayed in the opening day of Sangshak battle, decisions that were to enable most of 50 Brigade to concentrate and fight in the vortex of Sangshak, they would have come to nothing without the valour and self-sacrifice of the doomed company at Point 7378.

  If it hadn't been for the valour of 50 Pare Bde delaying the advancing Japanese sufficiently long enough then IV Corps wouldn't have had time to adjust their defences around Imphal.

 On the Japanese side the battle at Point 7378 weaken the strength of the battalion and the casualties hampher their subsequent battles at Sangshak and  Kohima. 

 

Disclaimer :- The data and figures are not exclusive in itself. It manifest the writers research at the point of writing this article.